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5Feeling 
Digital culture has become instrumental for 
capturing and managing what Raymond 
Williams would once have called “struc-
tures of feeling”. The journal issue A Peer-
Reviewed Journal About Machine Feeling 
alludes to this, and points to a material 
analysis of aesthetics and culture, including 
its technical and social forms, and in the way 
that this concept was originally employed 
as an acknowledgment of the importance of 
the hard to capture dimensions of everyday 
life. Styles, expressions and sentiments are 
always in flux, yet Williams, and others after 
him, have with this term argued that they are 
grounded in cultural history and specific eve-
ryday situations. In developing a critical and 
analytic understanding we should therefore 
turn our attention to changes in language, 
style, aesthetics and those social forms 
which are active in the present, but not yet 
fully formed or captured by a conceptual or 
scientific knowledge framework. Taking their 
point of departure from Williams, Devika 
Sharma and Frederik Tygstrup write: 
We recognise the facts of cultural 
life once they are established and 
institutionalised, but we tend to miss 
those moments when new patterns of 
experience emerge, when people start 
to think differently, when new sensibili-
ties arise, when habits swerve. (4)
This journal issue further explores 
this line of thinking, and more specifically 
responds to the current developments in 
machine learning and the ability of technolo-
gies to capture and structure feelings and 
experiences that are active, in flux, and in 
the present; for example, in the ways that 
automated experiences of seeing and read-
ing begin to produce knowledge through the 
capture of everyday styles, expressions, 
preferences, sentiments, and so forth – the 
very means that Williams alludes to. 
If, in general, machine learning appears 
to lack an affective dimension, then in what 
ways are we to understand its resolute and 
concerted pursuit of this? What old registers 
of processing culture and organizing time, 
space and power does it build on? What 
potential new sensibilities and structures of 
feeling may arise in such normalized registers 
of our habits? What new cultural and social 
forms and practices emerge in the coming 
together of machine learning and structures 
of feeling? In each their own way, the authors 
in this journal explore these questions. 
Failure
To capture moments when new patterns of 
experience emerge, when people start to 
think differently, when new sensibilities arise 
will first and foremost depend on a large set 
of training data — sound, text, biological 
data, and more that can be used for image 
recognition, sentiment analysis and more. At 
a more general level, these datasets absorb 
all kinds of social and cultural production; 
they seek to absorb every moment that peo-
ple start to think, act, sense, and experience 
phenomena in new ways. 
There is a certain paradox in this. As 
pointed out by Matteo Pasquinelli, machine 
learning is a paradigm of intelligence that 
fails to provide a methodology of failure. 
What people generally refer to as artificial 
intelligence and machine learning is merely 
a statistical mapping of correlations in the 
dataset. Because of this, machine learning 
will reduce the least common structures in 
the dataset, simply in order to reduce calcu-
lation costs. Consequently, machine learning 
is not a sign of cognition, but of compression 
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as a means to efficiency, which on the other 
side is also a loss of diversity; failure does 
not exist. In this, he claims, machine learning 
seems much more aligned with a history of 
optical lenses who operate by resolutions 
and diffraction. This is what he calls statisti-
cal cinema. This problem of generalization or 
“regression towards the mean” is mathemati-
cal but not without political consequences.
Fallacies 
What then is the role of researching digital 
culture and machine feeling? On the one 
hand, to follow Williams and capture the 
“habits that swerve” seems to be relegated 
to corporate research institutions that seek to 
align calculation costs and statistical resolu-
tion; institutions that perform the statistical 
spectacle of contemporary digital culture. On 
the other, could researching machine feeling 
be regarded as an interrogation of the fail-
ures of machine learning; or, even providing 
a methodology of failure that machine learn-
ing otherwise lacks?
This kind of research could take differ-
ent shapes. For one, it might address the 
implied inclusions and exclusions that are at 
play in the politics of research, such as the 
intersectional feelings of race, gender, and 
class. It might address the emotionalisation 
of not only politics and a people born to 
feel (which seems to be intrinsically related 
to the statistical spectacle), but also of re-
search itself and how it links to subjective 
patterns of experience. The contributions 
to the journal resonate with this approach 
and expose some of the fallacies at work in 
research processes once feelings are en-
gaged. The subsections of this journal reflect 
this problem: making sense (Iain Emsley, 
Maike Klein, Irina Raskin); (un)being (Maria 
Dada, Tiara Roxanne, Rebecca Uliasz, Brett 
Zehner); feeling generators (Malthe Stavning 
Erslev, Michela De Carlo, Carman Ng, Tanja 
Wiehn); and seeing things (Mitra Azar, Daniel 
Chavez Heras, Tomasz Hollanek, Rosemary 
Lee, Carleigh Morgan).
There is more than a hint of Williams 
(and his cultural materialism) across these 
positions in recognition of the ways that 
certain ideas (such as affect theory and ma-
chine learning) achieve hegemonic status. 
We, as contributors to this journal issue, all 
feel/felt the weight of history and privilege 
here, not least as the workshop leading to 
the publication was held at the University 
of Cambridge where Williams himself once 
taught. The setting for our (and his) work is 
clearly an important issue if we take struc-
tures of feeling seriously and recognise that 
the contents of a journal such as this are a 
consequence of a wider factors that include 
actual work, social relations, and place of 
production: “it is a trivial fantasy to suppose 
that these general and pressing conditions 
are for long or even at all separable from the 
immediate and the personal”, as Williams 
puts it (Culture and Materialism 222). Herein 
lies the tension between received forms and 
lived experience, of structures of feeling.
Thanks to all authors as well as further 
contributors to the workshop (Anne 
Alexander, Alan Blackwell, Anja Breljak, 
Jennifer Gabrys, Kristoffer Gansing, 
Leonardo Impett, Matteo Pasquinelli, Søren 
Pold, Winnie Soon, Magda Tyzlik-Carver, 
Martin Zeilinger), a collaboration between 
transmediale festival, Aarhus University, 
and Cambridge Digital Humanities Learning 
Programme. 
We dedicate this issue to the memory of 
Sascha Pohflepp.  
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